Download Citation on ResearchGate | Content and Self-Knowledge | La these Pastist externalists (e.g., Boghossian ; Burge ) maintain that the past. Volume 17, Issue 1, Spring Philosophy of Mind. Paul A. Boghossian. Pages DOI: /philtopics Content and Self-Knowledge. Content and Self-Knowledge. Paul A. Boghossian University of Michigan. INTRODUCTION I. This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis.

Author:	Jucage Tygolmaran
Country:	Austria
Language:	English (Spanish)
Genre:	Career
Published (Last):	20 June 2005
Pages:	190
PDF File Size:	12.71 Mb
ePub File Size:	16.47 Mb
ISBN:	262-5-58508-407-7
Downloads:	32854
Price:	Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader:	Goltishakar

This attitude is encouraged by research from empirical psychology, which suggests that self-knowledge is largely an illusion.

Content and Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind

That seems to hold, even if their narrow psychological states are the same. For instance, several theories say in short that a concept [ 5 ] has its content in virtue of certain causal relations the concept bears to an environmental referent DretskeMillikan ;Fodor ; ; also, cf.

Volume 10Boston: This view hypothesizes that possession of a non-empty kind concept requires the ability to ostend or demonstratively identify instances of the kind by perceptual means Brewer ; a; b.

Although self-verifying judgments are atypical, Burge still thinks they are adn to block the inference from A to B. Yet in light of his resistance, Boghossian formulates bothossian different version of the slow switch argument.

Paul Boghossian, Content and self-knowledge – PhilPapers

Even the relevant selr-knowledge account denies the externalist armchair self-knowledge in such a scenario. Sign in Create an account. In its place is a different compound that looks, tastes, etc. But see McLaughlin BeebeeBurge Still others see content as determined by the inferences that feature the relevant concept.

Other relevant collections include:. Slow-switching is a relevant alternative here, since it is assumed that Oscar actually is slow-switched.

The argument is this: Further, some writers have worried that if one can know what one thinks, then one can know that one thinks. Alison Gopnik – – Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 1: As Burgep. Self-knowledg b is regarded as stipulative, and premise c is thought to be the lesson of the slow switch experiment.

Bibliography Works Cited Anderson, C.

On the first reading, EXT holds that a water thought logically or conceptually implies some environmental condition E. So in particular, in the context of the reductio, W. Mark Textor – – Dialectica 65 1: Knowledge of Content and Knowledge of the World.

After all, as one writer observes: If slow switching actually occurred on a regular basis, it would be a relevant alternative that could not be excluded from the armchair, and the externalist would lose SK.

Given the two types of slow switch argument, note that sections 3.

For instance, suppose Oscar knows he is driving through a countryside with at least one barn, but some defeating condition is introduced e. Problems and Prospectspp. self-knowlwdge

And putatively, the problem with armchair self-knowledge does not arise with narrow content. The debate on externalism and self-knowledge should continue contenf see new developments.

Still, it may remain intuitively compelling that a Twin Earth thought experiment, if cogent, would show 1 apriori—even if E is just the condition where water exists. Yet one is unable to do so from the armchair.

But the existence of the thought must be acknowledged before one can concede a warrant to it. But see Baker Either the externalist sees the unicorn-concept as necessarily empty or not. For instance, well-known Quinean arguments exist against apriori knowledge, though this is not the place to discuss these. The first way, discussed in section 2, is by a reductio ad absurdum: So, Oscar does not know at t 1 that he thinks p. The skeptic might offer two different replies to the self-undermining charge.

Ebbs also makes the analogous point about the justification for Ifollowed by similar objections and replies. The slow switch thought experiment again features Oscar on Earth—yet this time, we suppose he is unwittingly switched to Twin Earth e. Toward making this clearer, suppose that Oscar is informed of the switches at some later time t 3.

But it is worth noting that the view allows an externalist to resist the memory argument. Further argument has been offered for this principle Boghossianyet such arguments may beg the question by presupposing a Chomskian, internalist notion of logical form Parent a,ch.