“Function and Concept” (German: Über Funktion und Begriff, “On Function and Concept”) is an article by Gottlob Frege, published in The article involves a . : Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung (): Gottlob Frege: Books. Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung. [Gottlob Frege] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Mit den hier von Günther Patzig zusammengestellten und.

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While conventional accounts of meaning took expressions to have just one feature referenceFrege introduced the view that expressions have two different aspects of significance: Because d [ Lm ] maps objects to truth values, it is a concept. Thanks for telling us about the problem.

Crocodile added it Dec 07, Frege, however, had an even deeper idea about how to do this. Frege’s ontology consisted of two fundamentally different types of entities, namely, functions and objectsb, He developed powerful and insightful criticisms of mathematical work which did not meet his standards for clarity.

The rule governing the first inference is a rule which applies only to subject terms whereas the rule governing the second inference governs reasoning within the predicate, and thus applies only to the transitive verb complements i.

Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung: Fünf Logische Studien

This sounds circular, since it looks like we have analyzed. The article involves a clarification of his fukntion distinction between concepts and objects.

Frege as Idealist and then Realist,” Inquiry 22 1—4: Moreover, Frege proposed that when a term name or description follows a propositional attitude verb, it no longer denotes what finktion ordinarily denotes. Using this notation, Frege formally represented Basic Law V in his system as: But despite appearances, there is no circularity, since Frege analyzes the second-order concept being a concept under which two objects fall without appealing to the concept two. Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University’s proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy.


Johannes Stellwagen marked it as to-read Dec 20, Frege opened the Appendix with the exceptionally honest comment: One final important difference between Frege’s conception of logic and Kant’s concerns the question of whether logic has any content unique to itself.

Unfortunately, Basic Law V implies a contradiction, and this was pointed out to Frege by Bertrand Russell just as the second volume of the Grundgesetze was going to press. Second order concepts correlate concepts and relations with truth values. Open Preview See a Problem? Bwgriff marked it as to-read Aug 12, Frege then took his analysis one step further.

Function and Concept

Pavel Materna funktipn – Axiomathes 23 4: By contrast, in the modern predicate calculus, this last step of analyzing predication in terms of functions is not assumed; predication is seen as more fundamental than functional application.

MacFarlane addresses this question, and points out that their conceptions differ in various ways:. And I’d like to thank Paul Oppenheimer for making some suggestions that improved the diction and clarity in a funtion of sentences, and for a suggestion for improvement to Section 3. Neuenhann, ; translated by H.

The introduction of negative quantities made a dent in this conception, and imaginary quantities made it completely impossible.

Index of language articles.

6 Funktion, Begriff, Wertverlauf, Klasse : Gottlob Frege Eine Einführung in sein Werk

One puzzle concerned identity statements and the other concerned sentences with subordinate clauses such as propositional attitude reports. Translated as Critique of Pure Reason by P. Therefore, Samuel Clemens was an author. Translated as The Foundations of Arithmetic: He never published a philosophical monograph other than The Foundations of Arithmeticmuch of which was mathematical in content, and the first collections of his writings appeared only after World War II.

A volume of English translations of Frege’s philosophical essays first appeared inedited by students of Wittgenstein, Peter Geach and Max Black —88with the bibliographic assistance of Wittgenstein see Geach, ed. It should be kept in mind that Frege was employed as a mathematician, not a philosopher, and he published his philosophical papers in scholarly journals that often were hard to access outside of the German-speaking world.


A concept F falls under this second-level concept just in case F maps at least one object to The True. Let us refer to the denotation and sense of the words as follows: Chaoticreader marked it as to-read Dec 10, Library records from the University of Jena establish that, over the next 5 years, Frege checked out texts in mechanics, analysis, geometry, Abelian functions, and elliptical functions Kreiser In what has come to be regarded as a seminal treatise, Die Grundlagen der ArithmetikFrege began work on the idea of deriving some of the basic principles of arithmetic from what he thought were more fundamental logical principles and logical concepts.

Since the object of arithmetic does not have an intuitive character, its fundamental propositions cannot stem from intuition… Fregetranslation in McGuinness ed. This rule is equivalent to a very powerful existence condition governing concepts known as the Comprehension Fregs for Concepts.

Despite the generous praise frgee Russell and Wittgenstein, Frege was little known as a philosopher during his lifetime.

Oxford University Press, 97— His ideas spread chiefly through those he influenced, such as Russell, Wittgenstein, and Carnap, and through work on logic and semantics by Polish logicians.

Nader marked it as to-read Oct 20, Russell recognized that some extensions are elements of themselves and some are not; the extension of the concept extension is an element of itself, since that concept would map its own extension to The True. Michael added it May 25, This explains why the Principle of Identity Substitution fails for terms following the propositional attitude verbs in propositional attitude reports.

Frege’s “conceptual notation” however can represent such inferences.

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