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From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland. Home Documents From Elections to Democracy: Post on Dec views. Even inthe countries that were in the first round for admission to the Euro-pean Union, much remains to be done. All of these countries haveconstitutional, electoral democracies and market economies. However,policy makers inside the government often lack accountability to thegeneral public and to important organized groups.
This study docu-ments the weaknesses of public oversight and participation in policymaking in Hungary and Poland, two of the most advanced countriesin the region. It discusses five alternative routes to accountability in-cluding European Union oversight, constitutional institutions such aspresidents and courts, devolution to lower-level governments, the useof neocorporate bodies, and open-ended participation rights.
It urgesmore emphasis on the fifth option, public participation. Case studiesof the environmental movement in Hungary and of student groups inPoland illustrate these general points. The book reviews the UnitedStates experience in open-ended public participation and draws somelessons for the transition countries from the strengths and weaknessesof the American system.
Susan Rose-Ackerman is the Henry R. She holds a Ph. Professor Rose-Ackerman is theauthor of Corruption and Government: Both of these books as well asFrom Elections to Democracy are products of the project, Honesty andTrust: Professor Rose-Ackerman has also published widely in law,economics, and policy journals. Her research interests include compar-ative regulatory law and policy, the political economy of corruption,public policy and administrative law, and law and economics.
Subject to statutory exception and to the provision ofrelevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take placewithout the written permission of Cambridge University Press. Subsidiarity and Delegation 47Legitimacy: Civic Dialogue and Public Participation Hungary: Poland and Hungary Sample Size by Country ixP1: I am grateful to all three institu-tions and to their funding sources for support.
In particular, the Williamand Flora Hewlett Foundation supported my research in two ways. I was especially dependent on the skill, integrity, and goodwill of Kati, Anna, Csilla, Maciej, and Aleksandra, native speakers ofPolish or Hungarian, who helped me with interviews and secondarysources.
Articles based on portions of this manuscript have been published inthe Journal of East European Law and in Building a Trustworthy Statein Post-Socialist Transition, one of two edited volumes that resulted fromthe Collegium Budapest terytrialny. The present project also builds on thexiP1: Reflections on the State-Building Process Rose-Ackerman a, band samozrd numerous inter-actions in fall in Budapest with other project participants.
This mono-graph is in some ways a sequel to Controlling Environmental Policy: On one account, democracy requires only a stable, com-petitive electoral system with broad suffrage, institutionalized politicalparties, and alternations in power.
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In a democracy, individuals and institutions mustjustify the exercise of power over others, and success in terytoiralny election is, Iargue, insufficient to make this claim.
I illustrate my argument through the study of terytoriaalny postsocialist coun-tries, Hungary and Poland, that have samorzr the transition to electoraldemocracy but have relatively weak policy-making accountability.
Theefforts at state building that followed the end of the socialist regimes inEastern Europe focused on the establishment of free elections and on1 This view of terytoriallny builds on Schumpeterchapter It has been most force-fully expressed in recent years by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi A country is classified as a dictatorship in a particular yearif at least one of the following four conditions holds: The chief executive is not elected,the legislature is not elected, there is no more than one huberrt, or, if none of the aboveholds, there is no recent alternation in power [Przeworski terytorialhy al.
Under that view of democracy, most countries inCentral Europe, Latin America, and Asia have made the transition to democracy. Usinga similarly minimal view of democracy and arguing that nothing more can be expected,Muellerargues that the transition was already complete in most postcom-munist countries by the mids. Many of thesestates, including Hungary and Poland, have made impressive progress ineffecting dramatic changes in their governments, economies, and soci-eties.
They have gone a long way toward rebuilding the ship at sea,as Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich Preuss demonstrate in theirstudy of the first years of the transition. But the task is not complete evenamong the frontrunners. During the first decade of the transition, little emphasis was given tobroader issues of popular control and government accountability outsidethe electoral process.
The costs are not primarily economic. Rather there is anincreased risk of popular disengagement from political life based on dis-illusionment and distrust of the state and its officials. Of course, even autocratic regimes may take onsome of the trappings of accountability izdebzki of contested elections.
Under socialism, both Hungary and Poland created institutions designedto give them legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary citizens. In a democracy,however, the governments need for popular legitimacy is much moresalient.
Contested elections are not sufficient but should be combinedwith procedures that promote accountability on a policy-by-policy basis. The state must take into account the interests and views of citizens both broad-based attitudes and those directed toward particular policychoices.
Libertarians would limit the state to a few basic tasks, such as set-ting the background rules izdrbski the game and providing for security anddefense. However, the minimal or night watchman state is not one thatminimizes the unjustified exercise of power. Private individuals and orga-nizations exercise power as well as state officials. Consider, for example,2 For example, Elster, Offe, and Preuss Two of the issues theymention are the reform of izdsbski state administration and devices for interest articulation inaddition to political parties.
This book studies the intersection of these two factors. Some of this material is summarized by Rose-Ackerman a, b.
Howard terytogialny includes some interviews.
Further-more, collective action problems lead to the imposition of external costsand the underprovision of public goods. The benefits that flow to thosewho start out with economic and social advantages are likely to persistin the absence of state action.
Minimizing the exercise of political powercannot solve the problem of power in society so long as one is concernedabout excesses of both public and terytoria,ny power and so long as one alsohas substantive goals for human well-being. If limits on the role of the state are not sufficient, then constitutionaland administrative systems need to require the state to justify its ac-tions and ought to enhance its competence.
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Elections limit the powerof individual politicians and political parties, and map citizens prefer-ences and goals into public policies. But that is only one step toward theconstruction of an accountable and competent democracy.
Like RobertDahland Guillermo TerytoriaalnyI emphasize the needfor additional checks on political power. ODonnellhuert adding the following: Some who challenge theminimal view of democracy add a range of other criteria to the definition, including mea-sures of individual freedom and rights and other institutional features of government suchas independent courts.
This has led to the development of one-dimensional democracyscales that aggregate a range of factors to produce a score. See Munck and Verkuilen and the associated commentaries for an overview and critique of the major indiceswith citations to the literature.
See also Beetham and Jaggers and Gurr Collier and Adcock seek a middle ground but limit their discussion to one-dimensional scores, whether dichotomous or continuous. Whatever value these scaleshave in facilitating statistical work, they omit much of the interest in the democratiza-tion debate by forcing a rich multidimensional phenomenon into a single-dimensionalmetric.
I build on his framework but then go on to focus moreintensely on other routes to popular involvement such as decentraliza-tion, neocorporate mechanisms for social dialogue, and direct publicparticipation. To be sure, the potential alternation inpower of different party coalitions does give incumbents a reason to avoidcertain blatant forms of self-dealing.
If parties and politicians expect tosurvive electoral defeat, they will fear that the opposition will discovertheir fraud and corruption. But, rotation in power is unlikely to induceincumbents to behave impartially. Winners want to help their supportersand to hurt their opponents. They want to enhance their power so thatreelection is more likely.
Neutrality in the interpretation and implemen-tation of laws is not what many politicians want. The potential for electoral defeat is a constraint on outright corruptionand fraud if incumbents believe they will face investigation upon leavingoffice. If the border between legal and illegal behavior is unclear and shiftingover time, one politicians efforts to benefit his or her supporters maybe viewed by others as a corrupt attempt to undermine state legitimacy. The reluctance of politicians to embrace reforms that would enhance theoverall performance of democratic government presents a challenge forthose who favor such reforms.
Partisan politicians will be uninterestedin or opposed to certain efforts to improve accountability Krastev andGanev Lindseths work on Western Europe takes a similar view.
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In a paper on delegation, hefocuses on ways to balance constitutional democracy with the reality of regulatory au-tonomy in the modern administrative state. To him, transparency and participation rightsare not simply a matter of political expediency but rather are an integral part of the consti-tutional settlement of administrative governance. My approachis also close to that advocated by Smulovitz and Peruzzotti in the Latin Americancontext. They discuss both formal institutional routes for accountability and more infor-mal types of pressure often exerted with the help of media coverage.
Hubett exception here is a very unstable izedbski whereincumbents, if overthrown, do not expect to reenter politics and may even expect to haveto flee the country. In such cases, they face an end game in which they may try to steal asmuch as possible before leaving office. This has happened at the end of izdebsi regimesthroughout the world.
Accountability means two different things in a democracy. First, it means that government agents, elected or appointed, are re-sponsible terytorialnj their principals through systems of monitoring and oversight.
This involves internal procedures by which elected politicians can controlthe career bureaucracy Dunn But ordinary citizens are the princi-pals of these same elected politicians.
For them to be able to monitor theirrepresentatives, the government must operate with transparency and thepress must be free so the public can hold the government to account forboth overall policies and the day-to-day implementation of programs.
Hubegt law requires impartiality, the citizens can, at least, observe whetherofficials are following these standards. If izrebski rules single out particulargroups for special treatment, citizens can observe the practical effects. Under this aspect of accountability, one takes policies as given, and thecentral issue is performance.